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IS "GUATEMALAN WOMEN" A VIABLE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
FOR ASYLUM PETITIONS? CIRCUIT SPLIT BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEAL FOR THE NINTH AND THIRD CIRCUITS
By Jazmin Moya1
ABSTRACT
Membership in a particular social group (“PSG”) is
one of five protected grounds that can form the basis
for an asylum claim under U.S. law.1 This protected
ground can be persuasively and effectively used to
establish asylum eligibility for an applicant who may
not “fit” into another of the five protected grounds.
Recently, Guatemala has seen a substantial increase
in femicide rates which are rarely investigated or
prosecuted.2 As a result, some Guatemalan women
who apply for asylum in the United States have
claimed membership in a particular social group of
“Guatemalan women” (and “young women in
Guatemala”).3 The Ninth and Third Circuits disagree
on whether “Guatemalan women” qualifies as a
particular social group and have each issued
conflicting tests to determine PSG eligibility. This
article will analyze the contradictory decisions of
each circuit and explain why the Ninth Circuit’s
broad inclusion of “Guatemalan women” as a PSG is
consistent with the requirements of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”).
INTRODUCTION
Guatemalan women fleeing gender-based violence
face a significant barrier to obtaining asylum in the
United States.4 All asylum applicants must fall
within the definition of “refugee” as stated in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”): “any
person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.”5
The violence and persecution of women in
Guatemala has forced many women to flee to the
United States or other countries for protection.6
United States asylum law requires applicants to base
their asylum claims on either past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution through one
of the five protected grounds listed in the INA.7
Rampant gender-based violence towards women
exacerbated by Guatemalan authorities’ inability to
protect them should be sufficient to establish a new
particular social group (“PSG”) as long as it is
consistent with the established criteria under existing
case law. This would place Guatemalan women’s
asylum claims under a more appropriate category;
other protected categories may not apply to those
claims or reflect the specific kind of violence from
which the applicant is fleeing.8
There is a circuit split on the categorization of
Guatemalan women as a specific PSG.9 The Ninth
Circuit held in Perdomo v. Holder that “Guatemalan
women” is a PSG for asylum application purposes.10
The court distinguished this PSG from other groups,
relying on the notion that “Guatemalan women” are
a PSG on because of their gender.11 However, about
eleven years after Perdomo, the Third Circuit held in
Chavez-Chilel v. Attorney General that the group is
too broad and should not be a PSG entitled to asylum
in the United States.12 This article will analyze the
holdings and reasoning provided by each circuit to
argue that “Guatemalan women” should be treated as
a PSG because of the extreme gender-based violence
that women in Guatemala face and because they are
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continuously at risk of being victims of such
violence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. RATES OF FEMICIDE IN GUATEMALA
The United Nations defines femicide as the killing of
women and girls because of their gender.13
Femicides can be committed by both intimate
partners and strangers and include many forms of
violence such as torture or punishment for sexual
orientation or gender identity.14 Femicides can be
“justified” as an “honor killing” and are thus rarely
investigated or prosecuted.15 This remains true in
Guatemala today. Increasing rates of femicide in
Guatemala have pushed women to seek asylum in the
United States.16 Guatemala is one of the three
countries known collectively as the “Northern
Triangle” along with Honduras and El Salvador.17
These countries are among the top five in the world
for rates of femicide which has led to increased
numbers of women migrating from these countries to
the United States and Mexico.18 For example,
between 2014 to 2016, 2,264 women in Guatemala
were killed with 611 murders reported as femicide
and less than two percent of perpetrators
imprisoned.19 Recently, reports showed a 31.1%
increase in femicide rates in Guatemala between
2020 to 2021.20 The high rates of gender-based
violence and femicide are a significant factor that
push women to seek asylum in other countries,
including the United States.21 Despite these alarming
trends, claims of gender-based violence have been
unsuccessful because the INA's grounds do not
specifically categorize gender as a protected group.22
B. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUPS FOR
RECOGNITION OF REFUGEE STATUS
Particular social groups must meet the following
three criteria established through case law:
immutability, particularity, and social distinction. An
immutable (or fundamental) characteristic is “a
characteristic that either is beyond the power of an
individual to change or is so fundamental to
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individual identity or conscience that it ought not be
required to be changed.”23 The particularity
requirement is met if “the proposed group can
accurately be described in a manner sufficiently
distinct that the group would be recognized, in the
society in question, as a discrete class of persons.”24
The social distinction requirement refers to a group
that must be perceived as a group by society. 25
A federal circuit split resulted from Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions. The
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)
is responsible for the management of the
Immigration Court and the BIA.26 The BIA has the
administrative authority to review cases that are
appealed from the lower-level immigration court
within the EOIR.27 BIA decisions can be appealed to
the federal circuit where the case originated.28
II. ANALYSIS
A. NINTH CIRCUIT: PERDOMO V. HOLDER
Lesly Yajayra Perdomo applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and Convention Against
Torture relief because of a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of her membership in the
“young women in Guatemala” PSG.29 Perdomo
argued solely for asylum eligibility on the ground
that she feared persecution because she was a young
woman in Guatemala.30 The immigration judge
denied her relief, rejecting “young women in
Guatemala” as a PSG because it was not a
“cognizable social group.”31 The BIA affirmed the
immigration court decision; however, the Ninth
Circuit found that in other cases, particularly
regarding female genital mutilation, groups were
found to be PSGs because of their gender.32 The
Ninth Circuit applied this reasoning to Perdomo’s
case and determined that “women in Guatemala”
could be a PSG.33 The case was remanded to the BIA
for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of
the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit previously implemented a twopart test in Hernandez-Montiel where a “[PSG] is one
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united by a voluntary association, including a former
association, or by an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its
members that members either cannot or should not
be required to change it.”34 In Perdomo, the Ninth
Circuit reiterated the criteria for PSG eligibility and
identified “Guatemalan women” as sufficient to meet
immutability and social distinction requirements.35
Relying on previous Ninth Circuit decision in
Hernandez-Montiel, the Circuit reintroduced the
two-part test to determine particularity that would
allow “Guatemalan women” to be considered a
PSG.36
B. THIRD CIRCUIT: CHAVEZ-CHILEL V. ATTORNEY
GENERAL
Eleven years later, the Third Circuit held that
“Guatemalan women” cannot be a particular social
group by applying a narrow definition of PSGs.
Martha Elena Chavez-Chilel petitioned the Third
Circuit for review of a BIA decision which affirmed
the immigration judge’s decision to deny her
applications for asylum and withholding of
removal.37 The Third Circuit required Chavez-Chilel
to show that the PSG of which she was a part was
one with members who share a “common immutable
characteristic” that is “defined with particularity”
and is “socially distinct within the society in
question.”38
By narrowly applying the three PSG criteria, the
Third Circuit held that the seemingly large group of
“Guatemalan women” was not a PSG without
properly reviewing each requirement based on case
law definitions of particular social groups.39 The
court disagreed that “Guatemalan women” is a PSG
because it lacks the “particularity” requirement,
arguing that “a proposed PSG of all women in a
particular country [] is overbroad.”40 In addressing
other circuits’ adoptions of a PSG definition for all
women in a country, such as Iranian and Somalian
women, the Third Circuit found that those “reasons
to depart from [the] general rule are not present here”
for Guatemalan women.41 In particular, the court
explained countries like women from countries like
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Somalia qualify as a PSG because of the widespread
prevalence of female genital mutilation.42 The Third
Circuit applied a very narrow PSG definition
specifically regarding particularity, alleging that “no
factfinder could reasonably conclude that all [of a
country’s] women had a well-founded fear of
persecution based solely on their gender.”43 The
court stated that there is no evidence to suggest that
all Guatemalan women “share a unifying
characteristic that results in them being targeted for
any form of persecution based solely on their
gender.”44 The court gave undue weight to ChavezChilel’s testimony that she knew of no other women
who suffered sexual or domestic violence as the basis
to discredit the claim that Guatemalan women share
a unifying characteristic: persecution based solely on
their gender.45 The court’s rationale in this case is
inconsistent with the cases it relies on for its
argument and is unfairly prejudicial to Guatemalan
women’s gender-based persecution claims. The
Third Circuit misapplied the holding of Hassan v.
Gonzales regarding particularity of a large PSG
where the Eighth Circuit held that the prevalence of
persecution against that large group (Somali women)
could allow a factfinder to conclude that all members
of that group have a well-founded fear of
persecution.46
C. WHY THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
SHOULD DESIGNATE “GUATEMALAN WOMEN”
AS A PSG
The Ninth and Third Circuits disagree about whether
a PSG can be of a substantially large size at all. The
Ninth Circuit rejects the notion that an applicant is
ineligible for asylum merely because all members of
a persecuted group might be eligible for asylum.47
However, relying on narrow requirements for PSG
eligibility, the Third Circuit does not accommodate
the humanitarian need to allow Guatemalan women
to flee the extreme gender-based violence they could
face by remaining in their country. Further, the Third
Circuit acknowledges that there are exceptions
where a PSG can be broad enough to include all
women of a country or region.48 Failure to include
Guatemalan women as an exception to establish PSG
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eligibility is discriminatory because the other groups
the Third Circuit recognizes as “acceptable
exceptions” are also broad groups of women
(Iranian, Somalian, and a particular tribe in Togo)
who are at risk of very substantial harm to their
bodies or lives.49 A common critique of expanding
asylum definitions to include larger groups is that
expanding asylum definitions could lead to a
“floodgate” of more applicants, and subsequently,
approvals for asylum.50 However, other analyses of
this potential floodgate show that these fears are
misplaced; there are multiple factors precluding a
"flood" of immigration, including poverty, family
These
obligations, and cultural restrictions.51
restrictions pose their own barriers to Guatemalan
women who may otherwise be eligible for asylum to
enter the United States.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Board of Immigration Appeals has defined the
criteria of PSGs too narrowly, which has led to
inconsistencies that vary by circuit and that have
harsh effects on individuals seeking relief.52 By
narrowly applying the definition of PSG, the BIA has
created inconsistencies in federal courts, forcing
asylum applicants to navigate an unpredictable
system. The Supreme Court has the authority to
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review the BIA’s definition of PSGs and redefine the
term to include a “social distinction requirement”
that would accommodate the inconsistencies
between PSG definitions that several circuits have
adopted.53 Additionally, the Supreme Court has the
authority to review the decisions of the Circuit
Courts, and to resolve the split between the two.54
Although the inconsistency between the Ninth and
Third Circuits is based on particularity, the BIA has
indicated that some groups that may be “broad and
diffuse” can meet the particularity requirement if
they are sufficiently distinct in the context of that
culture.55
IV. CONCLUSION
The circuit split on this matter creates an unclear,
unnavigable asylum system for refugees fleeing
gender-based violence and possible femicides in
Guatemala. Using the Third and Ninth Circuits as a
case study, the system as it stands creates gaps for
current and potential asylum applicants. Classifying
“Guatemalan women” as a PSG would provide
increased access to the asylum system of the United
States, increase the likelihood of their successful
claims, and prevent further inconsistencies in this
key area of asylum law at the federal circuit level.
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